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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals cases that the Editorial Board
of the Washington and Lee Law Review selected for the Fourth Circuit
Review exemplify the contemporary decisional profile of federal ap-
pellate courts. Distinctive to the profile are the contours shaped by what
I refer to as "new" public law controversies.1 Early cases involving this
type of litigation concerned segregated education and voting rights.
Some of these cases continue to arise, but the largest number of public
law cases now involve civil rights protection against discrimination in
employment and housing, and a host of rights created by legislation pro-
tecting consumers and citizens. This type of litigation occupies much of
our time and provides considerable public drama.
The contemporary profile of our end product has not been completely
changed, however, for the absolute number of traditional law suits has
multiplied. Diversity actions, cases in bankruptcy, admiralty, maritime
law, antitrust, standard administrative agency review, and criminal
law-originating from conventional sources, routed and decided through
traditionally structured court systems and procedures-were probably
more numerous than the "new" public law controversies.
Litigation of rights modernly designed to remedy old wrongs pro-
vides more public drama. It is often for reasons other than the con-
troversial substance of these rights, however, that such cases demand
more court time than their numbers indicate, and give rise to more ar-
ticulated differences among judges on the court. The legislation creating
these rights is frequently silent as to the structures and procedures a
court should use in litigation involving these rights. If not silent, the acts
usually indicate that courts should resolve the "new" rights within the
framework of traditional judicial concepts. More often than not,
however, problems raised in resolving these modern rights simply do
not fit into judicial structures conceptualized centuries ago to solve the
then new problems raised in diversity, admiralty, federal reservation
criminal cases, and the like. As a consequence, courts today spend much
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
I use "public law" as I perceive it is generally used, to refer to the many actions in-
volving the public sector-such as civil rights, consumer protection, environmental law-in
contradistinction to the law governing disputes between private parties. I refer to "new"
public law controversies as those arising under statutes enacted and cases decided after ap-
proximately 1950.
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time determining these new rights and judges often differ as to how the
traditional concepts apply
The ever-present chore of statutory interpretation, including the
unraveling of congressional intent, complicates the process. Ascertain-
ing congressional intent likewise presents a central problem in many
cases involving conventional dispute resolution, but unlike public law
legislation, these conventional congressional actions are normally pro-
gressive amendments, additions, or revisions of long-standing and fre-
quently applied laws. Congressional committees and courts usually have
developed ready, short-hand meanings and directions to implement
these actions. The precedential or legislative blueprints are often
available in fine-honed detail. The legislature frequently has drawn the
blueprints in the new areas of public law enacted during the past
twenty-five years, however, very broadly Courts must fill in the details.
Absent direction to consider these "new" issues under different pro-
cedural rules or philosophies, we resort to traditional procedural guides
found in cases involving standing, class action, intervention, res judicata,
and similar concepts developed within the traditional judicial infrastruc-
tures. The cases we decided during the survey reflect this modern
American judicial phenomenon.
While the surveyed cases cover a broad range of categories, this in
troduction discusses only some of the Fourth Circuit's recent cases
which illustrate this diverse role of modern federal courts. Roughly,
these cases include civil rights, criminal cases, prisoner rights, attorney
fees, and administrative law cases.
Actions generally viewed under the comprehensive canopy of "civil
rights" continued as a major part of appealed litigation in the Fourth
Circuit. These appeals included cases arising from race, sex, and age
discrimination in employment, housing, and other areas.
Recent decisions involving alleged discrimination often focused on
the methods of judicial decision-making-necessarily involving pro-
cedural concepts. The inevitable impetus of such modern decisional
technique has incorporated into civil rights decisions some of the rules
or even doctrines of the traditional areas of federal jurisprudence. Ap-
peals for judicial restraint notwithstanding, we have thus responded to
the duties placed upon us by Congress and prior decisions not only to
disc and harrow previously plowed sod, but to plow additional virgin
soil.
In Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,2 a central issue we addressed
concerned the appropriate standard for assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence necessary to establish improper motivation in an age
discrimination case. Judge Phillips, speaking for the panel majority, ar
ticulated the dispositive issue in the case as whether the defendant
would have demoted the 55-year-old plaintiff absent the defendant's
681 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1982).
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motive to discriminate against the plaintiff because of the plaintiff's age.
In the absence of a congressional standard, Judge Phillips looked to
Fourth Circuit tort cases for a test of sufficiency. Judge Phillips derived
a standard from those tort cases where causation was the dispositive
issue, and determined that the proper test of sufficiency in ADEA causa-
tion cases turned on whether the inference that the defendant
discriminated against the plaintiff was a "reasonable probability" rather
than a "mere possibility."
In Smith v. Town of Clarkton,3 we addressed a troublesome problem
inherent in housing discrimination litigation. It is well established that a
city has no constitutional duty to provide housing, equal or otherwise.
4 It
is equally clear that constitutional rights are implicated once a city con-
structs public housing--the fourteenth amendment guarantees citizens
equal access to it.5 Do these rights attach only after the city completes
construction? After partial construction? When the city planners or
legislators first conceive the plan for housing?
The dispute in Smith arose when Clarkton city officials, as a result
of public pressure, withdrew from a low-income public housing project
which would have served black residents of the area. At the time of the
town's withdrawal, which terminated the project, the local housing
authority had purchased a building site, engaged an architect, and ac-
cepted rental applications. We concluded that the town's actions were
racially motivated and violated both the fourteenth amendment and Ti-
tle VIII.
The decision is noteworthy for two reasons. First, the Smith decision
adopts for the first time in the Fourth Circuit the position other courts
of appeals have taken that the standard of proof necessary to establish
discrimination in Title VII cases applies equally to Title VIII actions.
The second and potentially more far-reaching holding is that both Title
VIII and the Constitution prohibit a municipality or other political entity
from substantially constructing public housing and then interfering with
its completion for racially discriminatory reasons. In stating this rule,
we emphasized the need for precisely tailored remedies, and accordingly
we modified the district court's order to require Clarkton to pursue ag-
gressively and in good faith the plans in progress prior to the town's
withdrawal from the project. When we reached this decision, however,
we left open the question of whether under other circumstances requir-
ing a municipality itself to complete the project might be justifiable.
The court in Adams v. Proctor & Gamble6 struggled with a narrow
but important question of congressional intent. Adams concerned an
EEOC settlement of a civil action charging employment discrimination
' 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982).
' Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
' See Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
6 678 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1982).
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via a consent decree after plaintiffs filed a lawsuit. The question we ad-
dressed was whether charging parties who had not intervened as parties
could disavow the settlement, and insist that the agency issue them
right-to-sue letters. The panel majority held that any charging party
who declined to intervene as a formal party and who declined to accept
the individual monetary award provided by a consent decree could be
issued a right-to-sue letter. Judge Haynsworth dissented, reasoning that
if the Commission timely filed a suit and a charging party failed to for-
mally intervene, that party should be held to have authorized the EEOC
to enter into a settlement agreement on his behalf. Adams was reargued
en banc, but as of the date of this writing the court has not handed down
the decision.
Hill v. Western Electric Co.' addressed a related problem concern-
ing the right to intervene in class action discrimination suits. In an
earlier appeal in the same case, we ruled that the class representatives
would not adequately protect the proposed intervenors' interests. The
intervenors filed the motion to intervene as representatives following a
remand, and the principal problems were timeliness and possible preju-
dice. The panel majority stated that "[iln a class action, the critical issue
with respect to timeliness is whether the proposed intervenor moved to
intervene 'as soon as it became clear ... that the interests of the unnamed
class members would no' longer be protected by the named class
representatives.' "8 The court found that since the representatives filed
the motion to intervene within ninety days after the Supreme Court
denied certiorari on the class representation issue, the motion was timely
filed. The majority opinion then stated that an important consideration
in passing on an application for intervention is whether the delay has
prejudiced the other parties. Because the filing of the complaint notified
the defendant of the possibility of classwide liability, the defendant was
not prejudiced. The court further ruled that any prejudice to the
members of the plaintiff class could be avoided by bifurcating the pro-
ceedings. Finally, the panel majority stated that the post-remand timing
of the motion should not militate against allowing intervention, and
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Chisholm v. United States Postal Service9 involved class action and
administrative exhaustion requirements and continued the effort to set-
tle the evidentiary problems inherent in employment discrimination
cases. Moultrie v. Martin"° clarified the proper use of statistical data in
discrimination cases generally. Brady v. Allstate Insurance Co." il-
lustrated the difficulty white employees face in establishing race
' 672 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1982).
8 Id. at 386 (quoting United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394 (1977)).
9 665 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1981).
II 690 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1982).
683 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1982).
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discrimination and noted the possibility that a stricter standard applies
in reverse discrimination cases.
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC" established an important "back pay"
precedent. Ford involved a sex discrimination suit based in part on the
company's hiring practices in 1971, when Ford refused to hire three
women for warehouse jobs. In 1973, Ford offered the same jobs to two of
the women, but without seniority retroactive to 1971. Both women
declined. A majority of the panel concluded that Ford's subsequent offer
of employment did not terminate the company's liability for purposes of
back pay. The court accordingly affirmed the district court's decision to
award back pay that accrued after each woman rejected Ford's 1973 job
offer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that absent special cir-
cumstances, the rejection of an employer's unconditional job offer ends
accrual of potential back-pay liability."3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 4 in the case of Brown v.
Eckard,"1 and remanded it to us with instructions to reconsider Brown in
light of General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon." A majority of
our panel in Brown had held that employees who had particularized
claims of discriminatory discharge could represent a class of employees
who allegedly suffered discrimination in promotion practices. General
Telephone, however, held that an employee complaining of individual
discriminatory promotion practices failed to prove himself to be a proper
representative, under Rule 23(b), of an "across-the-board" class of per-
sons allegedly discriminated against in hiring and other employment
practices.
These discrimination cases individually may vary in historical import-
ance, but they are significant in at least one unified respect. Each case
resolved issues involving rights our national legislature created, accom-
panied only by general instructions as to how courts should implement
these rights. We naturally resort to traditional jurisprudential concepts
and procedures, and the results are absolutely predictable -traditional
concepts and procedures are expanded.
As in every term, this past year presented a number of criminal law
issues of precedential magnitude. 7 A much greater number of criminal
appeals were disposed of by per "curiam opinions, perhaps as a result of
many counsel's perceived need to appeal every case. A substantial
number of the published opinions concern the constitutionality of searches
and seizures. Appellants attacked the detection of drugs concealed in
645 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 102 S.Ct. 3057 (1982).
13 102 S.Ct. 3057, 3070 (1982).
" Eckerd Drugs, Inc. v. Brown, 102 S.Ct. 1952 (1982).
15 663 F.2d 1268, reh'g denied by an equally divided court, 669 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1981).
102 S.Ct. 2364 (1982).
1' I, of course, subscribe to the view that every case is the most important case to the
litigants involved and that dispute resolution is our most important task.
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bales of hay, paper bags, wrapped packages, suitcases, glove compart-
ments, trunks, campers, cars, trucks, boats, and airplanes. Faithful to
our obligation to follow precedents that other panels first established
even when we disagree with the precedents, our opinions were generally
consistent. A review of fourth amendment opinions in the Fourth Circuit
and other circuits, however, breeds a suspicion that an appellant's suc-
cess at least sometimes rests on the "luck of the draw" in panel
assignments. Search cases frequently are so fact-intensive that in-
dividual judges sometimes interpret identical facts differently under the
same rule of law.18 Moreover, this discrete area of constitutional law is
one of the most discernable on-going examples of jurisprudential realism
in operation. As smugglers and narcotics dealers invent more
sophisticated and exotic methods of plying their trade, police attempt to
keep pace, and courts are required to referee new games with old sets of
rules. Changing views in the United States Supreme Court both affect
and reflect this syndrome.
In Sharpe v. United States,9 for example, a divided Fourth Circuit
panel held that the trial court should have suppressed marijuana
evidence at trial, as the fruit of an illegal detention. The Sharpe court
also held that the warrantless search of burlap-wrapped marijuana bales
" I am continually impressed, especially in view of the great increase in the number of
appellate judges, with the collegiality of the federal appellate courts. En banc rules and
honored tradition work toward conformity of precedent both within our circuit and among
the circuits. As Justice Rehnquist recently said, however, "Judges, whether at the trial or
appellate level, are not fungible: Each brings to the bench a mind imprinted with his or her
previous experience." Remarks of Justice William Rehnquist, Mac Swinford Lecture,
University of Kentucky (Sept. 23, 1982).
The collegial mechanics of the Fourth Circuit are time consuming for each judge, but
the system is honored, respected, and it works. Intracourt precedential conflicts rarely occur
and the court rules and attitudes respecting collegiality practically always resolve thse con-
flicts. Some precedents, however, take longer than others to stabilize. See, e.g., Epsilantis
v. Califano, No. 80-1600 (4th Cir. April 13, 1982).
Epsilantis, a former delicatessen clerk, filed a claim for Social Security disability
benefits. He established a prima facie case of disability by showing that his medical im-
pairments prevented him from working as a clerk. The Secretary concluded that Epsilantis
was not disabled because he could use the skills he had acquired as a clerk in other seden-
tary occupations. Significantly, the Secretary did not identify the specific jobs to which Ep-
silantis could transfer his skills.
The Secretary's use of administrative notice appeared to be contrary to Taylor v.
Weinberger, 512 F.2d 664, 668 (4th Cir. 1975), which held that the Secretary can ad-
ministratively notice only the existence of specifically identified alternative jobs. However,
in Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981), the majority approved of a regulation
which effectively relieved the Secretary of any burden to identify specific job alternatives.
Later, the majority in Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 268 (4th Cir. 1981), criticized the regula-
tion, but stopped short of rejecting it because of the precedential effect of Frady.
Recognizing the obvious conflict, the court voted to hear Epsilantis en banc. After
briefing and argument, the en banc court affirmed the district court by a five-five vote, thus
unavoidably maintaining a possible precedential conflict.
19 660 F.2d 967, 970-72 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated, 102 S.Ct. 2951 (1982).
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found in the back of a camper was unconstitutional. The panel cited Rob-
bins v. Californsa° as precedent for this latter ruling. In the interim,
however, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Ross. 1 The
Supreme Court conceded that its holding in Ross was inconsistent with
Robbtns, but the court nonetheless held that the scope of a warrantless
search of an automobile is not defined by the nature of the container in
which the contraband is secreted. The Court later remanded Sharpe for
our court to reconsider in light of Ross.
United States v. Steed," a criminal procedure case, illustrates the
necessary twentieth century judicial mobility The government by
statute now may appeal post-verdict acquittals23 without offending the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. 4 The question in Steed
concerned the standard of review of such acquittals by a trial court after
a jury verdict of guilty
Judge Phillips, writing for the majority of the original panel, felt
that appellate courts reviewing a post-verdict judgment of acquittal
should limit themselves to correcting errors of "pure" law and otherwise
should accord absolute deference to a trial court's assessment as to
whether there was sufficient evidence to support a verdict. A majority
of the court sitting en banc disagreed and held that the applicable stand-
ard is whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the government, supports the jury's verdict-the same standard ap-
plicable to a defendant's appeal of his conviction on evidentiary grounds.
Pro se prisoner cases continue to demand much court time from
judges and staff. Surprisingly, the number of prisoner filings has subsided.
There were twenty-four percent fewer filings in the first nine months of
1982 as compared with the same period in 1981. No one is quite sure
what this reduction means. Have the adjudicated principles been with us
long enough to make prisons aware of the unfavorable results in
frivolous filings? Are we articulating the rules more clearly9 Are district
courts spending more time dealing with these cases? The answers are
not apparent to us, nor to our staffs. Despite this year's reduction,
however, pro se prisoner cases comprised a substantial portion of our
decisional work.
During the survey year we saw the usual wide variety of these ap-
peals. From the time the judicial doors were opened widely to prisoner
cases, the inherent problem of separating cases involving real and
serious questions from those of a de minimis or frivolous nature has
0 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
21 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982).
674 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1982).
2 Criminal Appeals Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
24 United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 348-51 (1975); United States v. Dixon, 658 F.2d
181, 187 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Rojas, 554 F.2d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1977). See also
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980).
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troubled courts. Trial and appellate courts alike realize that prisoners
see their rights through a different looking glass. Liberty or property in-
terests of seemingly small consequence to those in the outside world
take on great value to those incarcerated. Prisoners also may exag-
gerate perceived injuries to rights in the strained, artificial atmosphere
of a prison. Distinguishing those cases with possible merit from frivolous
ones, then, represents a large part of our task of administering that por-
tion of our judicial system relating to prisoner complaints. The Supreme
Court in several recent cases eased this burden and we gladly followed
their lead. In Parrott v. Taylor," the Supreme Court held that a
prisoner's due process rights were not violated when prison employees
negligently lost his property since the state in which the prison was
located had a post-deprivation tort claim procedure. We reviewed
numerous cases this year involving the Parrott issue, and found no basis
for section 1983 claims against states with proper tort claim procedures.
If the sufficiency of a state's tort procedure was unclear, we normally
remanded to the district court to make that determination.
Exhaustion of state remedies was an important issue in many of the
prisoner cases, and courts continue to define the parameters of this re-
quirement, as evinced by the Supreme Court's recent holding in Rose v.
Lundy. 6 Rose, holding that a federal court must dismiss section 2254
habeas corpus petitions which present both exhuasted and unexhausted
claims, already has led to dismissal of scores of petitions.
Our court considered exhaustion of state remedies in Harding v.
North Carolina,' in which we disallowed the practice of "conditional
waiver" of exhaustion by state authorities. With conditional waiver, the
state agrees to be bound by a federal court's decision when the federal
court reviews on habeas corpus an unexhausted challenge to a state con-
viction, only if the federal court decides the claim is meritless. We held
that the conditional waiver practice could not comport with the prin-
ciples of federalism underlying the exhaustion requirement.
Exhaustion concerns also arose in section 1983 actions. In Hamlin v.
Warren,' a divided panel held that courts should treat a prisoner's sec-
tion 1983 claim which attacks the validity of a state court's judgment of
conviction as a habeas corpus petition, subject to the exhaustion require-
ment even though the prisoner couches the remedy demand in terms of
damages and declaratory judgment. Both the majority and dissent
acknowledged that the case presented a novel issue that the Supreme
Court never directly addressed, but differed on their readings of the
Court's related holdings in this area. In Patsy v. Florida Board of
, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). ,
102 S.Ct. 1198, 1199 (1982).
- 683 F.2d 850, 852-53 (4th Cir. 1982).
664 F.2d 29, 31-32 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1261 (1982).
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Regents,' the Supreme Court later ruled that courts cannot require ex-
haustion of administrative remedies in section 1983 cases.
Violations of first amendment rights, real or alleged, still comprise a
basis for many section 1983 actions in the Fourth Circuit. Municipal
employees, particularly firemen, have asserted their right to criticize
their public employers and the court uniformly has upheld those rights."0
Other first- amendment cases include Local 391, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. City of Rocky Mount,31 a picketing case,
and Davenport v. City ofAlexandria ' 2 which involved an attack on a city
ordinance's time-space limitations, which restricted first amendment ac-
tivities on city streets.'
Lawyers of yesteryear, faced suddenly with today's federal court
system, would have found it impossible to list to their clients the
plethora of federal rights available to them. Today's average generalist
no doubt has difficulties keeping pace. Five years ago, for example, a
statutory scheme rarely provided attorney fees and expenses to a win-
ning litigant. Many lawsuits have been "killed aborning" by the compas-
sionate advice that "you may be right but you can't afford the expense
involved in proving it." This is no longer the case, at least not necessarily.
Today many statutes provide that the unsuccessful litigant pay his op-
ponents' attorney fees. Litigation involving those attorney fees reflects
and symbolizes perhaps more than any other aspect of modern practice
the drastic evolution of the pursuit of rights in a federal forum. We
decided several such cases in the reported year. None of those cases may
be remarkable, but the number of attorneys' fees cases decided in one
year in one circuit throws considerable light on the federal system's new
structures.'
While we refused in Taylor v. Kelsey34 to referee a private fee
dispute between two attorneys, the court granted en banc consideration
of a case involving disqualification of counsel. In Greitzer & Locks v.
Johns-Manville Corp.,31 the issue on appeal was whether the district
court erred in disqualifying a law firm from participating in approx-
imately seventy-seven Virginia asbestosis cases. A former Justice
102 S.Ct. 2557, 2560 (1982).
Neal v. Howell, 689 F.2d 473, 476-78 (4th Cir. 1982); Hickory Fire Fighters Ass'n v.
City of Hickory, 656 F.2d 917, 920-21 (4th Cir. 1981); Henrico Professional Fire Fighters
Ass'n v. Bd. of Supervisors, 649 F.2d 237, 241 (4th Cir. 1981).
3, 672 F.2d 376, 377 (4th Cir. 1982).
, 683 F.2d 853, 854 (4th Cir. 1982).
Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1982); Morris v. Social Sec. Admin., 689 F.2d
495 (4th Cir. 1982); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 688 F.2d
218 (4th Cir. 1982); DeMier v. Gondles, 676 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1982); Anderson v. Morris, 658
F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1981).
" 666 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1981).
No. 81-1379, slip op. at 3-4 (4th Cir. March 5, 1982).
19831
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Department attorney, who had participated in defending the United
States in Virginia asbestosis litigation, recently had joined the firm. The
panel majority overturned the disqualification order of the district
court. It was undisputed that the Ethics in Government Act disqualified
the former Justice Department attorney from participating in the
Virginia asbestosis cases. The panel majority held, however, that the
law firm properly screened the former government attorney from
Virginia asbestosis cases. The panel dissent argued that the law firm
failed to timely impose the screen, and the firm unilaterally regulated
the screen, which the district court found had tarnished the firm's
reputation for reliability and dependability in screening the former
government attorney. After en banc consideration, an equally divided
court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Our decisions increasingly recognize that attorneys are integral to
the administration of justice as participating partners in the system."
The concept is as old as Anglo-American jurisprudence. Spurred by con-
gressional action, however, federal court decisions are shaping the
attorney-client relationship into a more active and responsible one.
" The reverse side of this is that we, like a good many other courts, also expressed
concern that attorneys had used the attorney-client privilege as a shield for possible
criminal activity. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 674 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1982); In re
John Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079-81 (4th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 40:459
